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Abstract
The preparation of the Basic Principles of the Headquarters Agreement presents a unique
challenge for the PrepCom. As explained earlier, the two-step process for the conclusion of the
headquarters agreement has never been utilized before in the history of international organizations.
Other factors, such as the time-pressure created by the ongoing work in a related Working Group
also made the task more difficult. The Bureau of the PrepCom responded to the challenge with
a unique working-method and procedure. The process, which may look somewhat cumbersome,
managed to forge a heightened level of understanding among the Bureau, the host country, and
the U.N. Secretariat concerning the procedure and the substance of the project. The Bureau felt
comfortable with its new role, while the U.N. Secretariat, for the first time in the PrepCom process,
received substantive guidelines before it set out to draft the first document. The structured inter-
action among the main actors provided for a natural development of the Basic Principles, which
not only led to the preparation of a widely accepted first draft, but, in the humble opinion of the
coordinator, will also facilitate the quick conclusion of the headquarters agreement.
THE MAKING OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT
Zsolt Hetesy*
INTRODUCTION
The Statute of the International Criminal Court' provides,
in Article 3, paragraph 1, that the seat of the Court shall be es-
tablished at The Hague in the Netherlands. The Statute further
provides in the same article that the Court shall enter into a
headquarters agreement with the "host State."'2 Resolution F of
the Final Act3 of the Rome Conference provides that the Prepar-
atory Commission of the International Criminal Court, which is
mandated to prepare proposals for practical arrangements for
the establishment of the Court, shall prepare, inter alia, the draft
text of "basic principles governing a headquarters agreement to
be negotiated between the Court and the host country."4
With the drafting of the Basic Principles of the Headquar-
ters Agreement of the Court ("Basic Principles"), the Prepara-
tory Commission ("PrepCom") started a new project without
precedents. Previously, if an international organization needed
a headquarters agreement, it was drafted without prior guide-
lines. The Rome Conference opted for a two-step process when
it decided that the PrepCom should prepare the Draft Basic
Principles, which later will be approved by the Assembly of States
Parties of the Rome Statute. Once the International Criminal
Court is established and the Court and the host country enter
into negotiations on the headquarters agreement, their negotia-
* Legal Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the United
Nations; Coordinator, Working Group on the Basic Principles Governing the Head-
quarters Agreement of the Preparatory Commission for an International Criminal
Court.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9*
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter
Rome Statute] (adopted on July 17, 1998 in Rome by the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court).
2. Id. art. 3.
3. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10*
(1998), Resolution F.
4. Id.
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tions will be governed by the Basic Principles.5 Following the
conclusion of those negotiations, the draft headquarters agree-
ment will have to be submitted to the Assembly of States Parties
for review and adoption. After the Assembly approves the text,
the President of the Court, on behalf of the Court, will conclude
the headquarters agreement with the Government of the
Netherlands, which, in turn, will have to submit it to its Parlia-
ment.
One may ask why such a two-step process was utilized. The
decision stems from the unique nature of the International
Criminal Court. Other international judicial organizations in
The Hague, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia 6 ("ICTY") and the International Court of Jus-
tice, had no legal status to conclude agreements on their own
behalf. Therefore, in the case of those organizations, the United
Nations Secretariat negotiated the headquarters agreements on
their behalf.
By contrast, the International Criminal Court, for obvious
reasons, enjoys a sovereign legal status and broad legal capacity.
In order to fulfill its purposes, the Court will enjoy substantial
independence from the treaty body establishing it, namely, the
Assembly of States Parties. Other practical arguments were also
enumerated in favor of leaving the actual negotiation of the
headquarters agreement to the Court and the host Country.7
5. As it is also specified in the Basic Principles, the Court and the host country, in
fact, will also depend on other documents, like the Rome Statute, the Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the Court, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
while developing the draft headquarters agreement.
6. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the For-
mer Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1166 (1998); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000).
7. Right from the beginning of the preparatory process a number of States, includ-
ing the host country, maintained that the nature of the headquarters agreement differs
substantially from other documents prepared by the PrepCom, such as the Relationship
Agreement between the Court and the United Nations, or the Agreement on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the Court. The latter agreements set forth the future rights
and obligations of not only the Court, but also of the States Parties themselves. There-
fore, the future States Parties, through the PrepCom, should all participate directly in
shaping the content of those documents. (In fact, the "open-ended" nature of the
PrepCom was particularly useful in forging consensus on the Relationship Agreement).
In contrast, the headquarters agreement is a more technical document that regulates,
on a bilateral basis, the presence and the activities of the Court in the Netherlands.
Therefore, the host country argued that the drafting of the headquarters agreement
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Therefore, the Rome Conference decided to empower the
Court itself, to negotiate the headquarters agreement directly
and on its own behalf with the host country. Hence, in the case
of the International Criminal Court, neither the PrepCom nor
the Assembly of States Parties will participate in the actual draft-
ing of the headquarters agreement.' Meanwhile, the majority of
States felt that the Assembly of States Parties should give some
guidance to the Court and the host country for the preparation
of the draft headquarters agreement. States wanted to ensure
compatibility and consistency between the headquarters agree-
ment and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Court. Furthermore, it was felt that the process leading to
the conclusion of the headquarters agreement should be as
quick as possible. With the approval of the Basic Principles of
the headquarters agreement, the Assembly of States Parties
could ensure that the Court and the host country have adequate
guidelines with which to work. The issuance of Basic Principles
could, in all probability, also minimize the danger of delays at
the later stage of the process, namely, when the Assembly has to
approve the headquarters agreement.
I. THE PROCESS OF PREPARATION
Despite the novelty of the process, there was general agree-
ment on the above-mentioned method before the Rome Confer-
ence. In fact, States accepted the two-step approach and, thus,
the need for the negotiation of the Basic Principles at the
March-April 1998 session of the Preparatory Committee in New
York. While differing views persisted concerning some of the
other functions of the future PrepCom at the Rome Conference,
the issue of Basic Principles received relatively little attention.
Then, after the establishment of the PrepCom in early 1999, the
question of Basic Principles was put on the back burner. The
should be left to the Court and the host country. Meanwhile, the duty to submit the
text for approval to the Assembly of States Parties should be sufficient to safeguard the
interest of the States Parties as a whole. The Rome Conference accepted this argument.
8. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ("OPCW") is an
example of another Hague-based international organization, which took a different ap-
proach. The OPCW was established by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Devel-
opment, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruc-
tion (August 8, 1994), which entered into force on April 29, 1997. The Preparatory
Commission of the OPCW drafted the headquarters agreement.
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PrepCom was racing against time in order to accomplish its most
pressing task, namely, the preparation of the Draft Elements of
Crimes9 and the Draft Rules of Procedures and Evidence1" by
the deadline of June 2000. Only after the finalization of those
drafts and the commencement of work on other documents,
such as the Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Court,"' could work begin on the Basic Principles. Finally,
the process started during the sixth session of the PrepCom,
when the Chairman of the PrepCom appointed a focal point for
the agenda item on December 1, 2000.
During the winter of 2001, the representatives of the host
country and the focal point discussed the future format and
structure of the document, as well as questions related to its
preparation and its timing. Based on bilateral consultations, in-
terested delegations also submitted certain proposals, which
were taken into consideration at the early stages.
The PrepCom, during its seventh session in March 2001, re-
quested the U.N. Secretariat to prepare the draft text of the Ba-
sic Principles governing the headquarters agreement. The Bu-
reau decided that the draft Basic Principles should be submitted
for consideration to the eighth session of the PrepComm. The
Bureau, based on the proposal of the focal point, also decided to
formulate a set of guidelines12 for the U.N. Secretariat concern-
ing the preparation of the draft. The Bureau resorted, for the
first time, to the issuance of such guidelines13 in order to indi-
cate to the Secretariat its wishes with regard to the format and
content of the draft and the timing and method of its prepara-
tion. The guidelines enumerated a checklist of issues to be con-
sidered while formulating the basic principles. In addition, the
9. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalized
draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
10. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalized
draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (Nov.
2, 2000).
11. Report of the Working Group, Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGAPIC/L.1 (Oct. 3, 2001).
12. Letter addressed to the Director of the Codification Division, Office of Legal
Affairs, United Nations (Mar. 16, 2001) (on file with author).
13. In the case of previous documents, first drafts were prepared by the Secretariat
of the United Nations without prior input from the Bureau or from future coordina-
tors. In this case, however, the Bureau felt that, due to the unprecedented nature of
the document and the need for the heavy involvement of the host country, it would be
advisable to take up more responsibilities at the early stages of the process.
2002] PRINCIPLES OF THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT 629
guidelines also provided the Secretariat with sufficient flexibility
to work out the details of the principles based on its own experi-
ence and with the help of direct contacts with the host country,
and other relevant international organizations, such as the ICTY.
The guidelines were discussed during a meeting organized
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in The
Hague on May 2, 2001. The meeting of the representatives of
the various Dutch Ministries, the U.N. Secretariat, and the focal
point endorsed the proposals contained in the guidelines. It was
agreed that the Basic Principles should provide guidance on all
aspects of the headquarters agreement. The suggestions on the
structure of the Basic Principles also commanded wide support.
Regarding the future content of the Basic Principles, the list of
so-called general principles was discussed and clarified in detail.
Subsequently, participants examined a sample document on spe-
cific principles, provided by the U.N. Secretariat. Suggestions
were made to shorten the future Basic Principles considerably
and to make them more general in nature.
On the basis of the meeting, the U.N. Secretariat prepared a
first draft of the Principles in consultation with the host country.
Comments were also requested from the ICTY. The above-men-
tioned participants met again in The Hague, on June 27, 2001,
to undertake a final review of the Draft, which was then sent to
Bureau members for comments. The Draft Basic Principles was
revised again by the Secretariat and was issued onJuly 16, 2001."4
II. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES
In the Draft Basic Principles an explanatory note preceded
the actual principles. This note explained the process for the
negotiation of the Basic Principles and the negotiation, adop-
tion, and conclusion of the headquarters agreement, as set forth
in the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and the Final Act.
The Basic Principles themselves were divided into two parts.
The first part, the general principles, enumerates the principles
that should govern the preparation of the headquarters agree-
ment and those other principles, which apply generally to the
headquarters agreement as a whole, or define the status of the
14. Basic Principles, Governing an Agreement to be Negotiated Between the International
Criminal Court and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Regarding the Headquarters of the Court,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGHQA/L.1 (July 16, 2001).
630 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:625
Court in general. The second part addresses, through a list of
specific principles, all issues that must be addressed in the head-
quarters agreement.
A. General Principles
The general principles represent the backbone of the Basic
Principles since, in many cases, they not only prescribe how to
prepare the headquarters agreement, but also give guidance for
the negotiating parties on how to apply the specific principles.
Consensus emerged on many of the general principles very early
in the process. In fact, many of them had already been articu-
lated in the guidelines of the Bureau and they were later incor-
porated into the Basic Principles without much change. The
general principles clarify, inter alia, that:
" The Court shall enjoy no less favorable treatment than any
other international organization located in the host coun-
try;1
5
" The headquarters agreement's primary purpose is to en-
able the Court to fully and efficiently discharge its responsi-
bilities and fulfill its purposes;1 6
" The headquarters agreement should support the indepen-
dence of the Court and provide for the long-term stability
of the Court; 7 and
" The headquarters agreement should attempt to resolve, in
an all-encompassing manner, all issues that could facilitate
the functioning of the Court.1 8 At the same time, it should
allow for the conclusion of supplementary agreements on
matters that were not foreseen during the negotiations of
the agreement, or are needed for the proper implementa-
15. See id. at 11(1) (h). During. the negotiations it was felt that, in particular, the
experiences of the ICTY and the OPCW could be considered in developing the provi-
sions of the headquarters agreement. The experiences of the ICTY, being an interna-
tional criminal court, could be directly relevant. The experiences of the OPCW could
be also relevant because, like the International Criminal Court, the OPCW, established
by a separate treaty, is an entirely independent organization, not related to the United
Nations.
16. Id. at I1(1)(d).
17. Id. at II(1)(e).
18. Id. at II(1)(i). The experience of the ICTY shows that in the headquarters
agreement, all-encompassing solutions with sufficient specificity are to be sought, since
filling in the gaps later, through amendments or supplementary agreements, tends to
be cumbersome. Therefore the set of principles shall not prevent the negotiating par-
ties from addressing other issues, if necessary or appropriate.
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tion thereof 9
The above-mentioned general principles give considerable
latitude to the negotiating parties, as far as the concrete solu-
tions are concerned. However, they also create clear standards,
against which the Assembly of State Parties will measure any, and
every, provision of the headquarters agreement. Some of the el-
ements, such as the "no less favorable treatment"20 clause, are
also deemed to be instrumental in lessening the need for speci-
ficity in different areas, such as the privileges and immunities of
the Court, or its officials.
B. Specific Principles
The set of specific principles strives to enumerate and cover
comprehensively all relevant issues, following a chapter-by-chap-
ter structure, 21 that are usually touched upon in any headquar-
ters agreement. The specific principles also pay particular atten-
tion to the special needs arising from the unique nature of the
Court. Therefore, the specific principles contain provisions on
the legal status, juridical personality, and the premises of the
Court; the privileges and immunities of the Court; the communi-
cation facilities and public services for the Court; and the privi-
leges and immunities of Judges, Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor,
Registrar, the officials of the Court, and the other persons taking
part in the proceedings before the Court. The document also
enumerates specific principles for the cooperation between the
Court and the host country, the amendment procedure, and the
procedure for the settlement of disputes.
When drafting the specific principles, some important ques-
tions had to be settled early on. First, it was emphasized that the
Basic Principles themselves should be relatively short, in order to
give flexibility to the Court and the host country and to avoid
19. Id. Not all legal and financial arrangements can be included in the headquar-
ters agreement. Additional arrangements, which may need to be concluded, could in-
clude further agreements on the premises, property, and services to be provided, by the
Netherlands and the City of The Hague (including cooperation on operational matters
such as transit of people, enforcement of sentences, or pretrial detention). These
agreements and supplementary understandings could also address seemingly peren-
nial, but important issues, such as Social Security regulations for Court officials, the
employment of relatives of officials, the question of interns used by the Court, etc.
20. Id. at II(1)(h).
21. The headquarters agreement may deviate from the grouping system used in
this part of the Basic Principles.
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drafting the actual headquarters agreement. The Basic Princi-
ples, therefore, does not contain detailed texts on aspects that
could be properly left for the negotiating parties. Nonetheless,
it was agreed that the Court and the host country do not have
complete discretion, since the Assembly of States Parties will re-
view all the details when it receives the draft headquarters agree-
ment for adoption.
Secondly, it was decided that the Basic Principles must be
comprehensive. Despite the fact that the PrepCom was negotiat-
ing a separate Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the Court, the relevant provisions on privileges and immu-
nities were included in the Basic Principles as well. Although
this may be repetitive, experience with other headquarters
agreements amply demonstrates that this approach is typical.
Also, there may be privileges and immunities that only pertain to
the host country or could be more specific or different in the
host country. These elements, therefore, must be included in
the Basic Principles and, later on, in the headquarters agree-
ment. The decision was also supported by the desire to provide
the Court and the host country with an all-encompassing docu-
ment.
22
Thirdly, since the Basic Principles had to draw extensively
on the elements of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immu-
nities, the PrepCom planned to proceed with its discussions on
the Basic Principles during its eighth session. It was envisaged
that, by that time, the Commission could finalize the Draft
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities. Later on, comple-
tion of the Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities
turned out to be impossible during the seventh session; nonethe-
less, the work on the Basic Principles could not be delayed fur-
ther. Therefore, the Draft Basic Principles had to be prepared at
a time when the outcome of the negotiations in the Working
Group on Privileges and Immunities was not known.
Finally, due to proposals received from interested delega-
tions, particular attention was devoted to the question of the As-
sembly of States Parties meetings. Despite the request for inclu-
22. The comprehensive nature of the Basic Principles does not, in itself, influence
the future structure and the level of repetition in the headquarters agreement. Since
the Basic Principles is silent on this issue, it will be a sensitive task for the Court and the
host country to come up with the necessary balance.
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sion, it was felt that the headquarters agreement of the Court,
which is negotiated by the Court and the Netherlands, should
not contain principles on such meetings and on the privileges
and immunities of the representatives attending those meetings.
It appeared inappropriate to request the Court to negotiate is-
sues clearly unrelated to the Court. In any case, such meetings
could be either in The Hague or in New York. Therefore, the
headquarters agreement would not cover the issue completely.
However, such a decision left the issue unregulated, except for
those rules in the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities.
III. NEGOTIATIONS AT THE EIGHTH SESSION OF
THE PREPCOM
The Working Group on the Basic Principles of the Head-
quarters Agreement held two formal meetings during the eighth
session of the PrepCom. As indicated above, the Draft Basic
Principles contained many provisions that relied on the Agree-
ment on the Privileges and Immunities. Since these related is-
sues were still being discussed in the Working Group on Privi-
leges and Immunities through the last day of the eighth session,
it was difficult to discuss the Draft Basic Principles in the other
Working Group. Therefore, based on the proposal of the coor-
dinator, the Working Group decided to proceed only with the
first reading of the Draft Basic Principles.
The Working Group decided not to hold a general debate
on the document. This did not mean that there was no room for
general comments or questions, butthat the document, in gen-
eral, was acceptable to the Working Group as the basis for its
discussions.
The general principles received strong support and were be-
lieved to create the proper foundation for the work of the Court
and the host country. Some of the comments focused on how to
properly reflect the relationship between the headquarters
agreement and other agreements, such as the Rome Statute and
the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court.
This issue and some other drafting questions will have to be re-
visited during the ninth session of the PrepCom.
Questions were also raised with regard to the interim period
preceding the entry into force of the headquarters agreement.
It was noted that immediately after the Statute enters into force,
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the Court, or some elements of it, will become operational at
The Hague. Therefore, there will be an initial period, during
which there will be no headquarters agreement to govern the
rights and obligations of the Parties.23 It was agreed that during
such period, the relationship between the Court and the host
country will be governed, by the general provision contained in
Article 48, paragraph 1, of the Statute. It provides that "[t]he
Court shall enjoy in the territory of each State Party such privi-
leges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its
purposes."2 4 The headquarters agreement, in turn, should also
provide for its provisional application following the conclusion
of negotiations between the Court and the Government of the
Netherlands, pending approval of the Agreement by the Assem-
bly of States Parties and the Parliament of the host country.
The majority of the specific principles also enjoyed general
support, while questions were raised in relation to some others.
One of the challenges before the Working Group during the
ninth session of the PrepCom will be finding the right balance
between not being too specific, while also including all relevant
principles which could assist the Court and the host country in
their negotiations. It was agreed in the Working Group, that a
number of the principles dealing with issues related to privileges
and immunities would have to be redrafted in order to insure
that the terminology and substantive issues appropriately reflect
the provisions in the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities.
However, delegations also noted that some specific principles on
privileges and immunities should particularly address the special
23. This period may be rather long. In the case of the ICTY, which was established
in May 25, 1993, the "Headquarters Agreement" was signed by the U.N. and the repre-
sentatives of the host country on May 27, 1994 and only then was it submitted for final
approval to the Netherlands and to the Security Council. The lapse of more than one
year between the creation of the ICTY and the entry into force of its Headquarters
Agreement is indicative in the case of the ICC. It is understood that entry into force of
the Rome Statute could happen sometime during the first half of 2002. In contrast,
real negotiations on the headquarters agreement would only start after the appoint-
ment of the Registrar of the Court, which will not happen before early 2003. It is,
therefore, only hoped that the providence of the Basic Principles could enable the ne-
gotiating parties to speed up the process and to submit the headquarters agreement for
approval to the meeting of the Assembly of States Parties during the fall of 2003. It has
to be noted that the Court, at its initial stages, will lack both the directly applicable
precedents and the readily available expertise that enabled the U.N. Secretariat and the
host country to finalize the draft headquarters agreement for the ICTY in one year.
24. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(1).
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relationship between the Court and the host country. This is a
matter that delegations will have an opportunity to consider dur-
ing the next session of the PrepCom.
Due to the general agreement on the nature of the exercise
before the Working Group, the endorsement of the underlying
principles, and the general support for the majority of the provi-
sions contained in the Draft Basic Principles, the Working
Group was able to complete the first reading of the text in re-
cord time.
IV. STEPS TAKEN AFTER THE EIGHTH SESSION OF
THE PREPCOM
In accordance with the decisions taken during the eighth
session of the PrepCom, the coordinator, with the help of the
U.N. Secretariat, prepared a revised text of the Basic Principles.
As a major change, the explanatory note in Chapter I detail-
ing the process for the negotiation of the Basic Principles and
the negotiation, adoption, and conclusion of the headquarters
agreement was removed. It has been replaced with a short Pre-
-amble to the actual text of the Basic Principles. Some changes
have been effected in Chapter II, containing the general princi-
ples, in order to include as many comments as possible. In
Chapter III-the specific principles-provisions concerning the
privileges and immunities of the Judges, Prosecutor, Deputy
Prosecutor, Registrar, the, officials of the Court, and the other
persons had to be restructured and reworded, due to the
changes made in the Agreement on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties. The set of provisions on visa-related issues was enhanced
and separated from the privileges and immunities. Based on dis-
cussions with the host country, provisions related to communica-
tion facilities and public services for the Court have been en-
hanced to reflect better the special relationship between the
Court and the host country. The Draft does not contain, how-
ever, any provision on matters related to the Assembly of States
Parties meetings. It is the view of the Secretariat and the coordi-
nator, that the Assembly of States Parties, if necessary, should
conclude a separate agreement on' this issue with the Nether-
lands. However, it is expected that some States will not share
this view at the PrepCom.
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V. FUTURE STEPS
The redrafted document, which takes the format of a discus-
sion paper proposed by the coordinator,2 5 was distributed in
February 2002. The Working Group will start its consideration
of the discussion paper at the April 2002 session of the
PrepCom. As it is currently planned, the Working Group will
hold five meetings during the first week of the PrepCom in or-
der to carry out the second reading of the draft.
Based on the above-mentioned changes in the discussion
paper and the large number of provisions, which enjoyed gen-
eral acceptance during the first reading, the Bureau expects that
the Working Group will be able to concentrate primarily on the
redrafted provisions. If that expectation proves to be justified,
the Working Group should be in the position to finalize its work
on the Basic Principles at the ninth session of the PrepCom.
CONCLUSION
The preparation of the Basic Principles of the Headquarters
Agreement presents a unique challenge for the PrepCom. As
explained earlier, the two-step process for the conclusion of the
headquarters agreement has never been utilized before in the
history of international organizations. Other factors, such as the
time-pressure created by the ongoing work in a related Working
Group also made the task more difficult.
The Bureau of the PrepCom responded to the challenge
with a unique working-method and procedure. The process,
which may look somewhat cumbersome, managed to forge a
heightened level of understanding among the Bureau, the host
country, and the U.N. Secretariat concerning the procedure and
the substance of the project. The Bureau felt comfortable with
its new role, while the U.N. Secretariat, for the first time in the
PrepCom process, received substantive guidelines before it set
out to draft the first document.
The structured interaction among the main actors provided
for a natural development of the Basic Principles, which not only
25. Basic Principles Governing an Agreement to be Negotiated Between the International
Criminal Court and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Regarding the Headquarters of the Court,
Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGHQA/RT.1
(Jan. 7, 2002).
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led to the preparation of a widely accepted first draft, but, in the
humble opinion of the coordinator, will also facilitate the quick
conclusion of the headquarters agreement.
